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ABSTRACT Among current techniques for dynamic access to television (TV) white space (TVWS), geolocation database-based access provides a promising performance in protecting the TV-band incumbents from
interference that cannot be efficiently achieved in other license-exempt models. However, in heterogeneous
wireless networks, most portable devices do not have such access and may cause interference to TV
incumbents. We propose a hierarchical model for spectrum sharing in TVWS that includes a wide range
of fixed and portable devices. In the first tier, the TV broadcaster can lease the spectrum bands to local
fixed users based on a soft license agreement. The fixed users are allowed to share access to this spectrum
with some mobile users in their proximity in exchange for cooperative relaying. We consider a practical
scenario, where only partial channel state information (CSI) is available at the users’ transmitters, and we
propose a robust algorithm against such uncertainties in CSI values. We also propose a reputation-based
relay selection mechanism to identify selfish portable users. The proposed spectrum sharing framework can
provide a practical model for TVWS-coexistence that prevents undesired interference to the incumbents
while restricting interference among the unlicensed devices. The simulation results show the enhancement
of fixed users’ rate compared with alternative relay selection methods.
INDEX TERMS Cooperative relaying, reputation, soft-license spectrum sharing, Stackelberg game,
imperfect channel state information, TV white space.

I. INTRODUCTION

Due to the ever-growing number of wireless users and the
emerging interest in multi-media services, the radio spectrum
scarcity has become one of the significant bottlenecks in
wireless communication technology. However, recent federal communications commission (FCC’s) reports revealed
that despite the rapidly developing demand for spectrum
access, the assigned licensed spectrum bands including the
TV broadcasting bands are not efficiently utilized at certain
times and locations [1]–[4]. While a considerable portion of
very high frequency (VHF) and ultra high frequency (UHF)
radio spectrum is allocated to the broadcast television services, the TV stations (primary network) may not use many
channels in different geographic areas due to the chance of
causing co-channel interference or interference with adjacent TV stations. This suggests that the unlicensed cognitive
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devices (secondary users) could operate in such vacant spectrum bands called as TV White Space (TVWS) if they assure
causing no interference to the incumbents [5]–[9]. Therefore,
the opportunistic access to TVWS can provide affordable
spectrum access for several indoor and outdoor communication systems such as rural broadband, home networking
and device to device communication through an efficient
radio spectrum utilization. Furthermore, this opportunistic
access can lead to lower energy consumption and better
propagation characteristic with a lower penetration loss for
cognitive unlicensed users by allowing them to operate in
low-frequency TV bands compared to industrial, scientific,
and medical radio (ISM) bands, particularly for indoor applications [10]–[12].
One of the key challenges in the widespread implementation of dynamic spectrum sharing mechanisms in TVWS
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is managing the severe interference caused by the excellent propagation characteristics over the TV bands. To do
so, we need effective mechanisms to protect both legitimate incumbents and the cognitive users from various
sources of interference. Most current technical and regulatory
radio spectrum sharing approaches focus on protecting the
incumbents from the interference caused by the unlicensed
users. These approaches can be generally classified into
two categories of i) preventive mechanisms, and ii) punitive mechanisms [13]. The goal of preventive mechanisms
is to reduce the probability of harmful interference to the
primary users [14], [15]. This can be achieved by determining spatial separation regions around the incumbents (exclusion zones), and enforcing reasonable sensing thresholds
on the spectrum sensing approaches [15]–[19]. In punitive
approaches, the selfish and malicious unlicensed users are
identified and adjudicated based on the level of interference
they cause [20]–[24].
To protect the heterogeneous unlicensed devices operating
in TVWS, several factors including the diverse characteristics
with regard to device types, different communication protocols, and network architectures should be taken into consideration [25]–[29]. In terms of the device categories for access
to TVWS, the cognitive users can either act independently
and attempt to access the spectrum by sensing the holes in
TV bands, or they need to have direct or indirect access to
TV databases. Spectrum sensing methods consume a lot of
power at the device and often show a poor detection performance in low signal to noise ratio (SNR) regions [30]–[32].
Therefore, the geolocation-based approach or a combination
of geo-location-based and spectrum sensing techniques are
commonly adopted for spectrum sharing in TVWS [33], [34].
In this method, certain information (such as their frequency,
schedule, location, transmitted power, and antenna pattern)
about the primary users is made available to the certified
cognitive users [35], [36]. This technique is mostly utilized
by fixed cognitive users with geolocation capability who can
report their locations to a centralized server. The cognitive
users utilize this information to estimate the coverage area
and availability of the incumbents at their locations. The users
that do not have direct access to these TV bands databases can
be enabled by authorized master devices.
The majority of existing technical and regulatory recommendations are for coexistence in TVWS and they are
based on the model of license-exempt wherein the unlicensed users can attempt to access the TVWS while protecting the incumbents’ rights [19], [25], [37], [38]. However,
several issues related to QoS for unlicensed white space
users, interference to other unlicensed users, fairness among
these heterogeneous devices, delay, and efficiency of spectrum usage still need further investigation. A regulatory
model called soft-license is proposed in [39] to provide an
access scheme between the two cases of exclusive-license
and license-exempt models. This model can provide limited regional-based or temporal-based access for the users
that need a higher level of certainty and priority in
VOLUME 6, 2018

spectrum access. Suitable candidates for this access category
includes the rural broadband services and delay-sensitive
services. This regulatory model is based on a hierarchical
structure consisting of primary licensed users, protected secondary services (soft-license users) with granted restricted
access, and unprotected secondary services (license-exempt
users) [39]–[41].
Motivated by this regulatory model, here we propose
a hierarchical model for spectrum sharing in TVWS to
enable interference-free coexistence among heterogeneous
unlicensed networks. In this model, the protected secondary devices which have granted spectrum access through
soft license [39], exclusive access by paying the regression
fee [42], or an auction-based mechanism [43] can lease their
reserved spectrum to unprotected/unregistered secondary services in exchange for cooperative relaying. This model can
support the coexistence of a wide range of secondary services that enforces a faithful behavior to the unlicensed
users through a reputation-based Stackelberg game theoretic
model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we present a survey of some recent works on using game
theory for spectrum sharing in TVWS followed by the contributions of this paper. The proposed hierarchical spectrum
sharing framework is described in Section III. In Section IV,
we present a brief overview of the Stackelgberg games.
Section V describes our proposed Stackelberg game model
for spectrum access. We present a performance evaluation of
our proposed method in Section VI followed by our concluding remarks in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORKS

In this section, we present a brief survey on recent
applications of game theory in addressing challenges
related to coexistence and interference management in
TVWS [42], [44], [45].
Based on the fact that many unlicensed devices do not
have geo-location capability or access to TV band databases,
several hierarchical access mechanisms have been previously proposed to provide spectrum access to a wide range
of unlicensed devices. Inspired by the WiFi architecture,
an infrastructure-based model for access to white space
is proposed in [46], where access of unlicensed devices is
enabled via multiple secondary access points (AP)s that
have access to the databases. Two distributed game theoretic models were presented to find the optimal solutions
for channel selection among the APs, and allocating the
secondary devices to the proper APs. The objective of the
latter game model is to provide a balanced distribution of
the secondary users among the proximity APs while avoiding
frequent switching of secondary users by considering the cost
of mobility.
In [44], a TVWS ecosystem is defined that includes several parties such as licensees (TV broadcaster), databases,
secondary operators, and end-users. An example of the secondary operators can be an infrastructure-based device owned
78993
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by a secondary operator which provides a wireless service
to several end-users or devices. This paper considers the
competition among the secondary users from the same pool of
end users who are attracted to buy the service from the operators. The operators need to estimate the required dedicated
spectrum considering the uncertainty of end users’ demand,
and determine a competitive price for providing service to the
end users noting the potential price offered by other operators. This competition is modeled as a non-cooperative pricequantity competition game. A hybrid pricing framework
for spectrum access in geolocation database-based model
is proposed in [47], where the owner of the database has
the authority to distribute the available TVWS bands to the
applicants based on a hybrid registration and service plan
pricing scheme. It is assumed that by utilizing a soft-license
approach, the white space devices can reserve a part of the
TV bandwidth during the registration scheme, while in the
service plan scheme, these devices make instant queries to use
the spectrum. A non-cooperative game is utilized to model
the users’ choices of spectrum access based on the bandwidth
reservation, registration fee and query plans.
A. PROPOSED WORK

In this work, we propose a hierarchical spectrum access
solution for heterogeneous networks of unlicensed users to
access TV white space. The FCC regulations categorize the
TVWS applicants into users with fixed devices (FD) and
users with portable devices (PD) [6], [7], [48]. The FDs use
outdoor antenna and operate in specific registered locations.
These devices have geolocation awareness as well as access
to the TVWS database. The portable or personal devices
are divided into two types of: 1) Mode I, and 2) Mode II.
Mode I devices are not aware of their geolocation and do
not have access to the database. Users with Mode I devices
are controlled by Mode II devices, which have geolocation capability and have direct or indirect access to the TV
band databases. The last category of white space devices is
sensing-only devices. These devices do not have any type of
access to the TVWS database and can only sense the spectrum
to obtain access [48]. Many efforts and updates on several
standards such as IEEE 802.11, 802.22, 802.15, 802.19.1,
1900.6, ECMA 392 and DySPAN SC have been developed
in response to these regulations [49], [50].
In this work, we consider a set of unlicensed users including an arbitrary number of users with FD who have access
to geolocation databases, and users with PD who may be
temporarily located in the proximity of a TV broadcaster. The
purpose of our proposed model is to provide a distributed
spectrum access mechanism for both users with access to
geolocation databases as well as mobile users that may not
have access to geolocation databases or afford to pay the
required monetary amount to the TV network. In this model,
the registered FDs act as retailers and can re-assign a portion
of their allocated spectrum to the users with PD in exchange
for relaying services. Therefore, the TV broadcaster can benefit from only interacting with local certified users whom it
78994

can monitor their loyalty to pay the spectrum price or their
behavior in terms of imposing any undesired interference,
while such a secure interaction with mobile users is not
necessarily feasible because of the risk of the presence of
malicious and selfish users.
Most current technical and regulatory studies on dynamic
spectrum management in TVWS rely on the assumption that
the secondary users are trustable to follow the access rules
since they are certified by authorities before deployment.
However, this assumption can be easily violated by selfish
users over the runtime, when they compete over the limited
TVWS or even to access the geolocation databases. Examples of such behaviors include imposing harmful interference to the spectrum owner, or refusing to pay the monetary
value or the cooperative services the secondary users initially
agreed to provide when granted spectrum access. This in turn
calls for reliable enforcement mechanisms to monitor the
users’ behavior [51], [52]. Utilizing reputation-based mechanisms is one way for the spectrum owner or the authority
in-charge to monitor the behavior of the unlicensed users in
order to differentiate between the users with selfish behaviors
and the ones with a higher level of reliability [20], [21], [24].
In this approach, observing the reputation of secondary users
can encourage them to maintain a high reputation to have
the chance of being trusted by the spectrum owner. The
level of harmful interference, reporting false information in
cooperative sensing model, the level of cooperation in providing relaying services, or the monetary payment history
are examples of reputation metrics for secondary users. The
reputation of secondary users can be directly observed by
the TVWS owners or via a trusted group of unlicensed TV
band users (retailers or registered secondary users). In this
paper, we develop a localized reputation-based cooperative
spectrum leasing mechanism in which the registered secondary users (i.e., the users with FD) can independently
monitor the record of the licensed-exempt secondary users
(i.e., the users with PD) during the course of their interactions
without relying on reputation inquiries from a central unit
in the network. Therefore, this method can be implemented
in distributed manner. In this model, the reputation of each
user is monitored based on effective cooperative power from
each selected user with PD, which is the multiplication of
the power by the squared absolute CSI of the corresponding channel. Therefore, the user with FD can monitor the
reputations using maximum beam combinations techniques
rather than relying on other users’ self-reports. It is worth
mentioning that compared to the trust mechanisms wherein
the users self-report their reputation, the proposed method is
robust against false reports disclosed by malicious unlicensed
users. Moreover, the self-report reputation methods incur
high signaling overheads in large-scale networks in order
to enable the unlicensed users to report their reputations.
In contrast, in our method the users with FD can locally
monitor the reputations of the users with PD. Since a large
number of unlicensed users with PD applicants are expected
to use the TVWS and given the high mobility of such users,
VOLUME 6, 2018
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the proposed reputation-based mechanism can provide a practical solution for hierarchical spectrum sharing in TVWS to
avoid causing a heavy signaling load on the TV band users
and prevent false self-reports.
Another important challenge in coexistence of heterogeneous communication networks is that the perfect channel
state information (CSI) of the communication links is not
usually available. This could be due to the lack of cooperation between these different networks, or the time delays or
frequency offsets between the reciprocal channels as well as
inaccuracy of the utilized channel estimation techniques [53].
One way of dealing with imperfect CSI to model the uncertainty in the CSI knowledge as an absolute bounded error and
design the system in such a way that is robust against these
uncertainties [53]–[55]. In this work, we also considered a
practical scenario where the perfect CSI of communication
channels is not available and we developed a spectrum sharing mechanism that is robust against these uncertainties.
We should also note that the existing Stackelberg
game-theoretic models for time division of spectrum access
between the licensed and unlicensed users, the leader’s
transmission power is assumed to be constant and the
algorithms only focus on the time allocation among the
users [20], [24], [56]. However, in this paper, we propose a
joint optimization problem to optimize the leader’s power and
the time-allocation for spectrum access and we show that the
optimization is equivalent to a convex optimization problem.
As a result, we provide a constructive approach of solving the
problem that guarantees the uniqueness and convergence of
the game solution.
In summary, the key contributions of our proposed model
include:
•

•

•

The proposed hierarchical spectrum sharing model provides an interference-free spectrum sharing framework
among the TV broadcasters and a wide set of different
types of unlicensed devices defined in FCC regulations.
To enhance the network performance and protect the
network from potential selfish behavior of unlicensed
mobile users, we propose a reputation-based game
theoretic model to enable the users with FD to observe
the behavior of available users with portable PD over the
course of time. The best PD candidates for cooperative
service are identified by noting their cooperative reputations as well as their channel quality.
In contrast to the majority of previously proposed solutions which assume a global knowledge of CSI to be
available, this model considers uncertainty in estimating
the channel state information.

III. SYSTEM MODEL

Let TVB denote a given TV broadcaster which covers a
certain geographical region, as depicted in Fig. 1. Several
local certified users with FD such as fixed users in rural
areas supported by broadband networks also exist in each
region, which have geolocation awareness and can obtain the
VOLUME 6, 2018

FIGURE 1. An example system model for one section in a TVB region that
includes one fixed user and six users with PD. The border of such a
section is displayed with a black circle. Four out of these six users with
PD devices cooperate with the FD to relay its message. In Phase I, the FT
broadcasts its message. During Phase II, the selected users with PD
forward the FT’s message after decoding, and as a reward, in Phase III
they transmit their own messages to their corresponding destinations
using a time-division access method.

TVWS access on a soft-license agreement or in exchange
for monetary benefits. We assume that TVB leases separate
frequency bands to these FDs. Hence, we can divide the TVB
neighborhood into small sections, each consisting of a single FD. Let FT and FR denote the fixed device’s transmitter
and receiver located in a given region, respectively. There
are several users with PD in this region that may not have
access to geolocation databases. The transmitter and receiver
associated with the jth user with PD for j = 1, . . . , NP are
denoted by PTj and PRj , respectively.
Slow Rayleigh fading channels are assumed, where the
channel coefficients remain constant over one time-slot. The
complex-valued reciprocal channel coefficients are defined
as hPj , hFPj , and hPj F which are the channel coefficients
between the transmitter and receiver of the user j with PD,
between FT and PTj , and between PTj and FR, respectively.
It is assumed that a direct link between the FT and FR does not
exist due to shadowing. Since the fixed and portable devices
belong to different networks, the availability of global CSI is
not a reasonable assumption as the standard channel estimation techniques can only estimate an imperfect CSI in such
a dynamic and mobile network. Therefore, we assume that
there is an uncertainty in CSI estimation where the estimation
errors are bounded. Mathematically, this assumption can be
expressed as:
hPj = ĥPj + ∇hPj ,

|∇hPj | ≤ Pj

hFPj = ĥFPj + ∇hFPj ,

|∇hFPj | ≤ FPj

hPj F = ĥPj F + ∇hPj F ,

|∇hPj F | ≤ Pj F .

(1)
78995

M. Zaeri-Amirani et al.: Hierarchical Spectrum Access Scheme for TV WS Coexistence in Heterogeneous Networks

where ĥPj , ĥFPj , and ĥPj F refer to estimated channel coefficients between the transmitter and receiver of the user j with
PD, between FT and PTj , and between PTj and FR, respectively. The notations Pj , FPj , and Pj F denote the maximum
absolute error to estimate channel coefficients between the
transmitter and the receiver of the user j with PD, between
FT and PTj , and between PTj and FR, respectively. Also we
define the uncertainty regions in CSI estimation by:

9 = ∀ ∇hPj , ∇hFPj , ∇hPj F |

TABLE 1. Summary of the notations.

|∇hPj | ≤ Pj , |∇hFPj | ≤ FPj , |∇hPj F | ≤ Pj F . (2)
The single-sided spectral density of independent Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) at the FD’s receiver and
the PDs’ receivers is shown by N0 . The maximum available power at FT is denoted by PF and maximum available
energy at jth user with PD is shown by Ejmax . The notations
Pjc and Pj denote the power allocated to cooperation and individual transmission of user j with a portable device. To avoid
co-channel interference to users in nearby sections and to
consider the physical limitation of the devices, the transmission powers PF , Pj , and Pjc are limited by the values Pmax
F ,
max , respectively.
Pmax
,
and
P
j
jc
During each time-slot, T , the FD willingly allocates a
portion of its own access to the leased spectrum to selected
PDs in exchange for relaying service. Section V describes
the corresponding relay selection criterion. The Decode-andForward (DF) relaying method is employed at the PDs, where
the fully decoded message received from FT is forwarded
to FR. Each time-slot T is divided into the following three
phases:
• Phase I: only the fixed user transmits for (1 − α)T
seconds, (0 ≤ α ≤ 1);
• Phase II: the selected PDs relay the FD data to its corresponding receiver for α(1 − β)T seconds, (0 ≤ β ≤ 1);
• Phase III: the selected PDs transmit their data for
αβT seconds based on a time division multiple access
technique.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume T = 1.
In Table 1, the notations used throughout the paper are
summarized.
IV. OVERVIEW ON STACKELBERG GAMES

Stackelberg game is a category of non-cooperative strategic
games, in which the players take their actions sequentially
rather than simultaneously. In Stackelberg games, one of
the players called leader has a higher priority in decision
making and can declare his/her strategy first. Then, the lower
priority users called followers rationally react to the leader’s
strategy [57], [58].
Let us define A1 , and A2 as the action set of the leader,
and the follower in a single-leader single-follower Stackelberg game, respectively. In this game, the follower selects
an action from its action set A2 , after observing the leader’s
choice. The Stackelberg equilibrium solution can be obtained
by locating the best strategy of the leader taking into account
78996

that the followers are rational and will select their optimal
strategy knowing the leader’s strategies. The Stackelberg
equilibrium solution can be calculated using the following
optimization problem,
max

(a1 ,a2 )∈(A1 ×A2 )

U1 (a1 , a2 )

Subject To: a2 ∈ argmax U2 (a1 , a02 ),

(3)

a02 ∈A2

where U1 and U2 are the utility functions of leader and follower, respectively. Compared to a game with simultaneous
moves (Cournot games), in Stackelberg games, the leader
always obtains a better payoff, since it knows that the follower
plays its best response in order to get at least the simultaneous
action’s payoff by choosing the Cournot game strategy [59].
V. PROPOSED REPUTATION-BASED
STACKELBERG GAME MODEL

The interactions among the users in this spectrum sharing
scenario is modeled with a Stackelberg game, in which the
FD as the owner of the leased spectrum is the game leader
and the users with PD are the followers. The rationale behind
selecting this model is that in Stackelberg games, the leader
has the right to state its strategy first, then the followers
rationally respond to the leader’s strategy. Thus, the fixed user
(game leader) can enforce its strategy on the followers. In our
proposed model, the strategy of the FD includes: i) selecting the best K users with portable devices for the relaying
service, ii) selecting its optimal transmission power, PF , and
iii) choosing the best time allocation parameters (α and β)
to divide each time-slot of spectrum access among its own
transmission, cooperative relaying and individual transmission for PDs. The strategy set of followers includes allocating
VOLUME 6, 2018
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the optimum transmission powers to their own transmission
and cooperation.
Among the users with portable devices, there may exist
selfish users who decline to forward the received message
from the fixed user, or only assign a small portion of their
available power to this cooperation after being granted with
the spectrum access. Spectrum leasing to such selfish behavior can significantly degrade the performance of FD’s communication due to unavailability of direct transmission link.
In our proposed model, the cooperative behavior of users with
PDs is observed over the course of time by defining a cumulative reputation factor that enables the fixed user to identify
and filter out the selfish portable users. This reputation-based
model encourages the portable users to sustain a good reputation in order to increase their chances of being picked out by
the FD in future interactions. The commitment of the users
with PDs to cooperative services is measured by the amount
of power they dedicate to packet forwarding.
The cooperative reputation of the jth PD, denoted by Cjn ,
is a cumulative factor that is used to capture the cooperative strategy of this user during the previous time-slots
while considering a penalty for generating interference to the
neighboring sections. Such cooperative reputation is updated
and stored by the FD to be used for relay selection in
future time slots. By setting the initial cooperative reputation
of PDj is Cj0 , at each time-slot, the cooperative reputation
parameter is updated based on a recursive rule as Cjn =
Cjn−1 + 1Cjn , n ≥ 0. The variation in reputation at timeslot n denoted by 1Cjn is defined as a function of the power
assigned by PDj to cooperation at time n, Pnjc , the power
allocated to its own transmission at time n, Pnj and also the
corresponding channel quality, as defined in (4).
(

Pjc
PF
|hFPj |2 , γ1 ( max )|hPj F |2
1Cjn = min Cs ( min
ψ∈9
Pmax
P
jc
jc
− γ2 (

Pj
))
Pmax
j

)

(4)

for n ≥ 0, where Cs (Cs > 0) is the quantization constant
step parameter, and hFPj and hPj F are the imperfect CSI of
channels between the FD’s transmitter and jth PD’s transmitter, and jth PD’s transmitter and FD’s receiver, respectively.
The first term in this definition refers to the fact that, from
the FD’s perspective, the benefit of relaying service depends
on the minimum of QoS between the downlink and uplink
links. Functions γ1 (x > 0) and γ2 (x > 0) are defined
to prevent the portable users from violating the limits for
Pj and Pjc regarding the co-channel interference to nearby
sections. As an example, these two functions are defined to
encourage PDs to set their powers in a range such that the
interference to the neighboring sections can be controlled.
(
x,
γ1 (x) =
2 − x 2,
VOLUME 6, 2018

x≤1
Otherwise

(5a)

(
x, x ≤ 1
γ2 (x) =
x 2 , Otherwise,

(5b)

In the majority of current reputation mechanisms, the nonaltruistic users self-report their reputations, therefore these
methods are vulnerable to false reputation reported by selfish
users and require an audit unit to be in place and verify the
reliability of these reported reputations [60]. Moreover, such
reputation exchanges among the users can impose a considerable signaling load to the network. In our proposed model,
the user with FD directly measures and keeps the record of the
reputation of users with PD, as defined in (4). Noting the definition of cooperative reputation in (4) which includes both
the transmission power and the channel quality, the behavior
of users with PDs can be monitored using simple beam ratio
combining techniques [61]–[63]. It is worth mentioning that
the user with FD only stores the cumulative reputation of each
user with portable device rather than saving the record of all
selected strategies over the course of time, hence does not
involve a considerable memory. If a user with FD does not
have any prior history of interactions with a user with portable
device, the user with FD will inquire from other users with FD
in its proximity to obtain a second-hand information about
reputation of this portable user by averaging the received
inputs [64].
Since only an imperfect estimation of CSIs is available to
the FD’s transmitter, it can consider the worst case scenario
to estimate the reputation variation. In this case, using the
following lemma leads us to find the closed-form expression
of Definition (4) as described in :
Lemma 1: For an arbitrary estimated channel coefficient ĥ
with uncertainty complex number δh such that |δh| ≤ ,
we have:
(
|ĥ| − , if  ≤ |ĥ|
min |ĥ + δh| =
= (|ĥ| − )+
∀|δh|≤
0,
if  > |ĥ|
(6)
Proof: Based on triangle inequality |ĥ + δh| ≥ ||ĥ| − |.
Therefore for the case of  ≤ |ĥ|, we have |ĥ + δh| ≥ |ĥ| − 
and δh = −  ĥ provides the equality. For the case of  > |ĥ|,
|ĥ|

δh = −ĥ provides zero norm and it proves our lemma.
By using (1) and Lemma 1, the closed-form expression of
Definition (4) can be written as:
1Cjn = Cs (min{

Pjc
Pj
PF + 2
2
(h̃FPj ) , γ1 ( max )(h̃+
Pj F ) }−γ2 ( max )),
max
Pjc
Pjc
Pj
(7)

+
+
+
where h+
FPj = (|ĥFPj | − FPj ) and hPj F = (|ĥPj F | − Pj F ) .
Using this definition, the user with FD selects the most
trusted K PDs among the available candidates for cooperative services. Then, to divide the time portion for PDs’
transmission (Phase III) among these selected ones in a fair
manner, the allocated time to each user j (i. e. βj ) is computed
P
proportional to Cjn−1 − min{Cin−1 } such that j βj = β.
i
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Cjn−1 , where Cjn−1 refers to cooperative reputation of user j
up to this time slot. Based on these definitions, the total
energy consumed by the jth PD can be written as αβj Pj +
α(1 − β)Pjc . The maximum energy of the jth PD is Ejmax , and
this constraint can be expressed as:
αβj Pj + α(1 − β)Pjc ≤ Ejmax .

(8)

During the first stage of the game, the user of FD selects
its strategy set including selecting the best portable relays
and the optimum time allocation parameters: α and β as
well as its own transmission power: PF . The best K relays
are selected among the N active users with PDs based on
their reputation scores.
P The relay selection can be modeled
by S = argmax( Cjn ), where SK is the set of group of
s∈SK

j∈s

users with cardinality K , and Cjn is the reputation of the jth
PD at time n. Hence, the strategy set of the game leader can
be summarized as (α, β, PF , S). For simplicity in notations,
we omit the superscript n in the rest of paper.
The fixed user determines the time allocation parameters α and β with the goal of optimizing its benefit from
cooperative DF relaying. Therefore, the utility of the FD,
UF (α, β, PF ), can be defined as its achievable transmission
rate through cooperation considering the cost of its transmission. Hence, the best strategy set of the FD can be obtained
as follows: 



minPF |hFPj |2


j∈S
),
max min min (1 − α) log2 (1 +

α,β,PF ψ∈9 
N0



X Pjc |hPj F |2 
α(1 − β) log2 (1 +
)

N0

During the second stage, the selected relays observe the
fixed user’s strategies and respond by setting the power for
cooperative relaying and their own transmission. Each user
with PD aims to maximize its transmission rate during its
allocated time, αβj , while maintaining a good cooperative
reputation. On one hand, the user j with PD prefers to select
a high value for its own transmission power, Pj , to enhance
its transmission rate. On the other hand, this user is required
to allocate enough power for cooperation, Pjc to maintain a
good reputation and increase its chances to be trusted by the
FD during the next rounds of the game. Moreover, there exist
an upper limit for both Pj and Pjc to control the interference
level to the nearby sections, and these allocated powers need
to satisfy the constraint on the maximum available energy
at this user as described in (8). The utility of fixed user j
is designed in such a way to meet these requirements as
follows:
UPDj (Pj , Pjc , ψ)
= αβj log2 1 +

N0
− ηP (αβj Pj + α(1 − β)Pjc ) + ηPC 1Cj

max UPDj (Pj , Pjc )

Pj ,Pjc

Subject to: 0 ≤ Pj ≤ Pmax
,
j

−ηF (1 − α)PF
0 ≤ PF ≤ Pmax
F ,

(9)

where parameter ηF is a pre-defined normalizing coefficient
for the energy consumed by FD to make it comparable to
the transmission rate. The first and second terms in the min
function are the achievable rates form the fixed transmitter to
the selected relays during Phase I, RFP and from the relays
to the FD’s receiver during Phase II, RPF , respectively. Since
each relay node independently decodes the message from the
fixed user, RFP is dominated by the worst channel between the
FD and the selected relays. By considering (1) and Lemma 1,
the optimization problem (9) is converted to:

α,β,PF

α(1 − β) log2 1 +

2
minPF (h̃+
FPj ) 
j∈S

N0
2
X Pjc (h̃+
Pj F ) 
j∈S

,

N0

− ηF (1 − α)PF
Subject to: 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1,
0 ≤ PF ≤ Pmax
F .
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0 ≤ Pjc ≤ Pmax
jc

αβj Pj + α(1 − β)Pjc ≤ Ejmax ,

Subject to: 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1

(10)

(11)

where ηP and ηPC are pre-defined normalizing coefficient.
Finally, by considering the worst-case scenario over all
uncertainties ψ ∈ 9, and by using (1) and Lemma 1,
the utility function of this user can be expressed as the
objective function of the following convex optimization
problem:

j∈S



max min (1 − α) log2 1 +

Pj |hPj |2 

(12)

where
UPDj (Pj , Pjc ) = αβj log2 1 +

2
Pj (h̃+
Pj ) 

N0
− ηP (αβj Pj +α(1−β)Pjc )+ηPC 1Cj . (13)

+
and h+
Pj = (|ĥPj | − Pj ) . The aforementioned reputationbased Stakelberg game is summarized in Algorithm 1. In the
next subsection, we present the solution of this game.

A. SOLUTION OF PROPOSED STACKELBERG GAME

In this section, we study the existence, uniqueness, and convergence of the Stackelberg equilibrium for the proposed
game.
Theorem 1: During each time slot, the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) of the proposed game model exists, and it is
unique.
Proof: To prove this theorem, we first need to show
that the optimization problem from the followers’ (i.e. users
with PDs) perspective has a unique solution. The constraints
in the optimization problem (12) represent an affine set.
By substituting (7) into (13), the objective of the optimization
VOLUME 6, 2018
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Algorithm 1 Proposed Reputation-Based Stackelberg Game
Step 0: Initialize reputation F All new users with PDs are
assigned with an initial cooperative reputation of C 0 .
while 1 do
Step 1: The user with FD selects the best K users with
PDs with highest reputation factors
Step 2: The user with FD and the selected users with
PD determine their strategies
F Initialize strategies of the user with FD, i.e. α, β,
and PF
while The convergence criterion is not met do
Step 2a: Calculate βj proportional to the jth user
with PD’s reputation factor up to previous time slot, Cjn−1
Step 2b: Maximize the utility of each user j with
PD and obtain their strategies, i.e. Pj and Pjc .
Step 2c: Maximize the utility of user with FD and
obtain α, β, and PF
end while
Step 3: Update the reputation factors of the selected
users with PDs
end while

optimization problem through which the user with FD finds
its optimum strategy is not a convex one.
Here, we prove that this optimization is equivalent to a
convex optimization problem. Let us define a1 = 1/ ln(2),
min(h̃+
)2
P Pjc (h̃+Pj F )2 
j∈S FPj
,
a
=
log
1
+
and a4 = ηF .
a2 =
3
2
N0
N0
j∈S

By defining new variables ρ = αβ, κ = (1 − α) ln(1 + a2 PF )
and ξ = 1 − α, the optimization problem (10) can be
converted to the following maximization problem:
a4
a4 κ
max min {a1 κ, a3 (1 − ξ − ρ)} − ξ e ξ + ξ
ρ,κ,ξ
a2
a2
Subject To: 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 − ξ ≤ 1
0 ≤ κ ≤ ln(1 + a2 Pmax
(15)
F )ξ.
Furthermore, by defining the auxiliary variable τ , the maximization problem (15) is transformed into the following
convex optimization problem:
a4
a4 κ
min − τ + ξ e ξ − ξ
ρ,κ,ξ,τ
a2
a2
Subject To: τ ≤ a1 κ
τ ≤ a3 (1 − ξ − ρ)

problem (12) can be rewritten as:
UPDj (Pj , Pjc )
= αβj log2 1 +

2
Pj (h̃+
Pj ) 

N0
− ηP (αβj Pj + α(1 − β)Pjc )
(
)
Pjc
PF + 2
+ 2
+ ηPC Cs min
(h̃FPj ) , γ1 ( max )(h̃Pj F )
Pmax
Pjc
jc
Pj 
(14)
− γ2 ( max .
Pj

The log2 (.) function, γ1 (.), and −γ2 (.) as defined in (5a)
are concave functions and the min{.} operation preserves the
concavity property. Therefore, the utility function of user j
with PD (i.e., 14)) is concave with respect to Pj and Pjc which
means that the utility maximization problem for the J th user
with PD is a convex optimization problem. From the above
discussion we conclude that the strategy of the users with PD
can be found uniquely and independent from the strategies of
other users with PD.
Next, in order to prove the existence, uniqueness, and
convergence of the SE in an one-leader-multiple-follower
Stackelberg game, it is sufficient to show:
• The strategy set of the leader is a non-empty convex
subset of some Euclidean space.
• The leader’s utility is continues and the leader’s utility
maximization problem represents a convex optimization
problem.
From (10), it is inferred that if Pmax
> 0 then the leader’s
F
strategy set, i.e. {PF , α, β}, is a non-empty convex subset of
some Euclidean space. However, as seen in equation (10), this
VOLUME 6, 2018

0≤ρ ≤1−ξ ≤1
0 ≤ κ ≤ ln(1 + a2 Pmax
F )ξ,

(16)

where the objective represents an exponential cone and all
constraints represent affine sets. After solving the convex
optimization problem (16) by using a quiet fast algorithm
such as steepest descent algorithm, the fixed user’s strategy
(i.e. α, β, and PF ) can be calculated as: α = 1−ξ , β = αρ , and
κ
PF = a12 (e ξ − 1), respectively. This concludes that the FD’s
utility maximization problem defined in (10) is equivalent to
the convex optimization problem (16). Therefore, the optimum strategy set of FD is unique and can be obtained from
a convex optimization problem. Moreover, the strategies of
the users with PD are obtained from a convex optimization
problem (12). This concludes the proof of uniqueness and
convergence for the SE of the proposed game model.
Theorem 2: The SE solution of the proposed game is a
Nash equilibrium (NE).
Proof: For a two-player non-cooperative game, a strategy set S ∗ = (s?1 , s?2 ) is NE if and only if
∀i ∈ {1, 2}, ∀si ∈ S,

Ui (s?i , s?−i ) ≥ Ui (si , s?−i ),

(17)

where S is the strategy set of the game players, and s−i
indicates the strategy of the opponent of player i.
The SE is obtained through a backward-induction, where in
each round, the user with FD declares its unique best strategy
set by optimizing the convex optimization problem (16),
and then the users with PD determine their unique optimum
strategy set from (12) as their best response to the leaders’
strategy. Therefore, since during both steps of backwardinduction, the game players select their strategy as the best
response to the other one, the Stackelberg equilibrium follows
the definition of NE.
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VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

To evaluate the performance of the proposed model, we consider a system that consists of a single user with fixed
transmitter-receiver pair, and 20 users with PD as potential
secondary relay users. Out of which, two users are assumed
to be selfish (unless specified otherwise), meaning that when
they are selected by the user with FD for spectrum leasing,
they do not assign any power to cooperative relaying and
exhaust their available energy for their own transmission. The
cooperative reputation of the users is normalized in the range
of [−1, 1], assuming an initial credit of 0.1 for all the users
and the quantization step parameter of Cs = 0.01. All users
with PD are randomly located in the proximity with radius
of 1 km from the user with FD’s transmitter. We also consider
six regions in the neighborhood of this use with FD and apply
a limit on the maximum allowable power of all users in this
region to avoid potential interference to the nearby regions.
The maximum available power at the user with FD is assumed
to be 10 Watt. The maximum available energy available at
the users with PD is assumed to be 1 Joule. All channels’
coefficients are generated as a zero mean complex Gaussian
random variable with variance of 0 dB. The noise power
spectrum is assumed to be 0 dBW. For simplicity, the duration
of each time slot is assumed to be one second. During each
time slot, the user with FD selects K = 5 users with PD for
cooperation purposes.

knowledge of: 1) channels between FT and users with PD
(downlink channels), 2) channels between users with PD and
FR (uplink channels), 3) channels between users with PD
and their own receivers, and 4) all channels at the same
time. As shown in figure 2, the average transmission rate
of FD decreases as uncertainty increases for all four cases.
The results also indicate the significant effect of quality of
downlink channels related to other cases. This is due to
the fact that during the first time-slot, the FD’s cooperative
transmission rate in DF relaying is dominated by the worst
downlink channel.

FIGURE 3. Average optimal power of FD versus uncertainty levels on CSIs.

FIGURE 2. Average rate of FD versus uncertainty levels on CSI values.

First, we show that the proposed game is robust against
uncertainties in CSI values. We performed extensive numerical analysis to show the performance of the system with
respect to such uncertainties. The CSI values with uncertainty are generated as complex Gaussian random variables
and bounded with uncertainty levels as a percentage of the
channel’s variances. A Monte-Carlo simulation considering
the worst case scenario for the knowledge of CSI values is
performed for different uncertainty levels. Figure 2 shows
the average rate for the FD versus the uncertainty levels,
i.e.  for four different cases of uncertainty in the CSI’s
79000

Figure 3 presents the strategy of FD in terms of transmission power (PF ) versus the uncertainty levels in CSI knowledge for the four aforementioned cases. This figure shows
that an increase in downlink uncertainty level has more effect
on the cost of FD, i.e. PF compared to uncertainty on the
uplink channels. The uncertainty on the channels between
users with PD and their destinations forces the FD to consume more power to satisfy users with PD’s incentive for
cooperation.
Figure 4 shows the effect of uncertainty in CSI knowledge
on the summation of transmission rates for selected users with
portable devices for the aforementioned four cases. While the
users with PD can compensate the effect of uncertainty in
their CSI knowledge up to a certain point, the increase in this
uncertainty level results in decreasing the summation rate of
these users. However, the uncertainty in the CSI knowledge of
the downlink and uplink channels are beneficial for the users
with PD. Since there is no direct transmission link between
the FT and the FR, the user with fixed device has to allocate
a bigger portion of the time-slot to the users with PDs (higher
values of α, and β) when facing higher uncertainty levels
in the CSI of the downlink and uplink channels in order to
encourage them for cooperation.
Figure 5 shows the portion of time-slot allocated to the
transmission of the users with PD as a reward of cooperative
relaying, i.e. αβ, versus the uncertainty levels. It can be
VOLUME 6, 2018
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FIGURE 4. Average of summation rates of users with PD versus
uncertainty levels on CSI values.

FIGURE 5. Time allocated to the transmission of the users with PD,
i.e. αβ, versus uncertainty levels on CSI values.

inferred that in case of uncertainties in knowledge of all CSI
values, the award time is less than the cases where there exists
an uncertainty in the knowledge of CSI values for only one
type of the downlink or uplink channels.
In figure 6, the transmission rate of the user with FD
for our proposed reputation-based model, where the FD can
identify and discard the users with selfish behaviors over
the course of time is compared to alternative relay selection
mechanisms. In our method, the cooperative reputation of
the users with PD is defined as a function of their power
assigned to relaying service as well as their CSI values. When
such a mechanism is not in place, the selfish PDs simply
do not assign any power to packet forwarding after their
spectrum access is granted. To show the effectiveness of such
reputation-based model, we consider a scenario where two
out of 20 users with PD are selfish in the sense that they do
not assign any power to cooperation after being selected by
VOLUME 6, 2018

FIGURE 6. Average rate of FD over time for four different scenario:
1) proposed reputation-based scenario, 2) reputation-based scenario
by only considering power in defining reputation, 3) best CSI selection
scenario, and 4) random selection scenario.

the FD, and set the maximum available power for their own
transmissions. We performed a Monte-Carlo simulation and
show that if such a reputation-mechanism does not exist and
K = 5 relays are selected either randomly, or based on best
minimum downlink and uplink absolute CSI values, then the
average FD’s rate quickly decreases. In figure 6, the average
FD’s achievable rate over time is plotted for four different
scenarios. First, we simulate the proposed reputation-based
algorithm and the results show the increase in the average
FD’s achievable rate over time. This result confirms the ability of the proposed model in recognizing and discarding the
users with selfish behaviors. In the second case, we re-define
the incremented reputation based on power only and not CSI.
This means that instead of definition (4), we use the following
formula:
!
Pjc
Pj
PF 2
n
2
1Cj = Cs min{ max σFPj , γ1 ( max )σPj F } − γ2 ( max ) ,
Pjc
Pjc
Pj
(18)
where σFPj and σPj F are the variances of ĥFPj and ĥPj F ,
respectively. The results show that for the case with alternative definition of reputation (18), the users with selfish
behaviors are still being discarded over time but the average
achievable rate is less than first scenario using our proposed
reputation formulation in (4). We examine two other cases in
which FD selects: i) K = 5 random users, and ii) K = 5
users with the best minimum downlink-uplink absolute CSI
values. In these two cases, two users are selfish who utilize
all of their available power to their own transmissions, and the
rest of users are assumed to be fully trusted in the sense that
they consume the same amount of power for cooperation as
well as in their own transmissions, i.e. Pj = Pjc . The results
show a lower average FD’s achievable rate for those cases
compared to the reputation-based scenarios.
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FIGURE 7. Utility of the user with fixed device versus K for different
uncertainty levels on CSI values.

Next, we investigate the effect of the number of relays,
i.e. K , on the FD’s utility. Figure 7 shows that in this figure,
there is an optimum value for number of relays. Although
selecting more relays can increase the FD’s transmission rate
due to higher cooperative diversity gain in the second phase
of DF relaying, it also increases the chances of having a
relay with low quality of downlink channel that would be
dominant during the first phase and reduces the overall FD’s
rate. Selecting a large number of relays can also increase the
chance of choosing selfish users that will result in reducing
FD’s utility.

FIGURE 8. Convergence of the strategies of the user with fixed device.

Finally, Figures 8 and 9 show the convergence of the proposed Stackelberg game model for strategies of FT (i.e. α, β,
and normalized PF to Pmax
F ) and strategies of users with PD
(power allocation between its own transmission and cooperation). The algorithm converges when the changes in users’
strategies over two rounds of game is less than 1%. As these
79002

FIGURE 9. Convergence of the strategies of the users with portable
device.

figures show, the stable solution is reached after a few rounds
of the game for the given setting. We also performed a
Monte-Carlo simulation to investigate the convergence of this
method for different network topologies and it was observed
that in average the stable solution is achieved in less than
10 iterations.
VII. CONCLUSION

In this work, we proposed a hierarchical model for spectrum
sharing in heterogeneous TVWS. The TV broadcasters can
lease a part of their spectrum bands to local users with
fixed device, and these local users can decide to sublease a
portion of their spectrum access time to the users with PD.
In return the users with PDs relay the FT’s message to its
corresponding destination. This can significantly improve
the QoS for users with FD particularly if the quality of the
direct transmission link is poor while providing the users
with PD with the opportunity of free spectrum access. The
proposed algorithm is designed in a way that it is robust
against uncertainties in the CSI’s knowledge in the network.
We proposed a reputation-based mechanism to enable the
fixed users to identify the malicious portable users and only
choose the trusted users with PDs for relaying purposes. The
simulation results show the performance of this system in
different network conditions and confirm the improvement of
the fixed user’s utility as a result of using the reputation-based
model compared to the scenario where the behaviors of users
with PD are not observed.
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